Labour Market Flexibility, Wages and Incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s.. by Kingdon, Geeta et al.
 
Labor Market Flexibility, Wages and Incomes in sub-Saharan 





Geeta Kingdon, Justin Sandefur and Francis Teal 
 
 
Centre for the Study of African Economies 
Department of Economics  






This paper provides an overview of how African labor markets have performed in the 1990s. 
It is argued that the failure of African labor markets to create good paying jobs has resulted in 
excess labor supply in the form of either open unemployment or a growing self-employment 
sector. One explanation for this outcome is a lack of labor market ‘flexibility’ keeping formal 
sector wages above their equilibrium level and restricting job creation. We identify three 
attributes of labor market flexibility. First whether real wages decline over time, secondly the 
tendency for wages to adjust in the face of unemployment, and thirdly the extent of wage 
differentials between sectors and/or firms of various size. Recent research shows that real 
wages in Africa during the 1990s may have been more downwardly flexible than previously 
thought and have been surprisingly responsive to unemployment rates, yet large wage 
differentials between formal and informal sector firms remain. This third sense of the term 
inflexibility can explain a common factor across diverse African economies - the high income 
divide between those working in large firms and those not. Those working in the thriving self-
employment sector in Ghana have something in common with the unemployed in South 








*We are greatly indebted to Simon Appleton and Trudy Owens, both of the University of Nottingham, 
for assistance with the Ugandan and Tanzanian household data.   2
1. Introduction 
 
How flexible are African labor markets and does the degree of their flexibility affect 
outcomes for poverty and growth? Theories of dual labor markets in which rigid wages in one 
sector lead to either open unemployment or a large informal sector have a long history in 
thinking about African development, Harris and Todaro (1970). As we will show in this paper 
the 1990s were a period when across many African economies there was a failure of labor 
markets to create good paying jobs with the result being either rising open unemployment or a 
rapid expansion of the informal sector. In this paper we ask what can explain these outcomes. 
We will argue that in doing so it will be useful to distinguish between several possible 
meaning to the term flexibility or its converse ‘rigidity’. 
Labor markets may be inflexible in at least three different senses of the term. The first 
is that real wage may not adjust over time to excess supply of labor or to macroeconomic 
shocks. As stressed by Horton, et al (1994), the need for downward flexibility of real wages to 
achieve full employment in response to budget cuts and other demand reductions was seen as 
a crucial feature of structural adjustment programs. The second sense in which labor markets 
may be inflexible is that, even without macroeconomic shocks, wages are unresponsive to 
high levels of unemployment. The third sense of the term is that there is a substantial 
differential across sectors distinguished either by whether or not the sector is unionised, or 
whether it is subject to minimum wage laws or whether the firms are simply large. 
These various meanings of the term inflexibility all have in common the notion that 
wages do not, for some reason, adjust to a market clearing rate. However they differ both in 
the possible mechanisms by which wages may be inflexible and in their policy implications. 
If wages do not respond to unemployment then labor markets will not clear but there is no 
reason to think large firms will be disadvantaged by being made to pay higher wages than 
smaller ones. We will argue that understanding the nature of the inflexibility that does 
characterise African labor markets gives important insights into key similarities across 
economies which appear diverse in the structure of their labor markets.  
In the next section we outline the overall trends that can be found in the development 
of labor demand and wages across African economies. How the range of outcomes can be 
characterised using the framework originally due to Harris and Todaro (1970) is set out in 
section 3. In sections 4 we consider which of the aspects of labor market flexibility 
summarised above are consistent with the existing evidence as to how labor markets work in 
Africa. In section 5 we consider in detail the answer to one question related to this general 
issue of flexibility: why do large formal sector firms pay high wages? A final section provides 
a summary and conclusions.   3
 
2. Recent macro trends in labor markets  
 
The first step toward understanding the factors that affect labor demand in Africa is to 
understand how African labor markets have performed in the recent past. Even a basic 
appreciation of recent trends is often hampered, however, by the difficulty in acquiring 
comparable information across countries and time periods for many African countries. Thus 
our first task is to bring together data from diverse sources to provide as comprehensive as 
possible a picture of labor demand patterns in Africa in the 1990s. The data gathered in this 
section provide an overview of how the labor market has evolved in several African countries.  
How is the African labor force distributed across sectors and which sectors, if any, are 
producing job growth? To answer these questions Figure 1 summarizes a wide range of data 
from individual household and labor force surveys to provide an overview of the distribution 
of employment across sectors at two points in time for five African economies: Ghana, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, and South Africa (details of the data sources are found in Table 
A1 of the appendix). These countries have been chosen as representative cases to illustrate 
the three part typology of labor market outcomes developed in the following section: 
structural unemployment in South Africa, search unemployment in Ethiopia, and a large 
informal sector serving as the employer of last resort in Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
Looking across all of the countries some common patterns can be observed. 
 #1. The level of wage employment has increased in absolute terms, but failed to keep 
pace with a growing labor force. Figure 1 shows that in all five countries formal wage 
employment has increased and that this very gradual trend in job creation has been driven 
primarily by the private sector, with the proportion of wage employees in the public sector 
declining in each country. However, expansion in the formal sector has not kept pace with 
population growth and/or growth in the size of the labor force, meaning that the relative 
proportion of workers in formal wage employment has either remained constant or declined 
in each country.  
  #2.The share of the informal sector in total employment has grown rapidly. The 
failure of formal sector jobs to keep pace with labor force growth implies an excess supply of 
labor to be allocated to other sectors. In all five countries the absolute numbers of self-
employed persons increased greatly during the time span documented here, and in contrast to 
formal sector growth, this indicates that the informal sector has increased as a proportion of 
the work force as well.
1 Thus the familiar stereotype of the informal sector absorbing excess 
                                                 
1 The category of non-agricultural self-employment is taken to be synonymous with the urban informal 
sector in interpreting these data. Clearly this is inaccurate for at least two categories of workers:  4
labor during a period of labor force growth seems somewhat accurate for the countries listed 
here. This also conforms with recent evidence presented by Calvés & Schoumaker (2004) for 
Burkina Faso, documenting a growing tendency for entry-level workers to turn to the 
informal sector.  
  #3. African economies with high unemployment rates have relatively small informal 
sectors. Figure 1 illustrates the great disparity in unemployment rates and the size of the 
informal economy across countries within SSA. Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda display low 
unemployment rates, while Ethiopia and South Africa have among the highest 
unemployment rates in the world. In terms of the size of the informal sector, the pattern is 
essentially the mirror image. It will be argued in later sections that both of these outcomes—
unemployment and informality—can be viewed as manifestations of excess labor supply, due 
at least in part to wage distortions in the formal sector. However, Figure 1 makes clear that in 
addition to understanding the causes of insufficient formal sector demand, it is also necessary 
to address the large divergence between economies dominated by unemployment and those 
dominated by the informal sector.  
 
3. Labor market segmentation: How are workers allocated between 
employment, unemployment and the informal sector? 
 
The picture of African labor markets which emerged from the data in the previous 
section was of uniformly low formal sector labor demand, with job creation failing to keep 
pace with labor force growth. Beyond this general feature of insufficient demand and excess 
labor supply, however, there was very little uniformity in labor market outcomes across 
African economies. Specifically, the rate of non-agricultural self employment ranged from a 
low of 10% of the workforce in South Africa in 1995 to over 27% in Ghana in 1998/99. 
Meanwhile, measured unemployment in Tanzania and Uganda is below 1%, while economies 
both richer and poorer reported rates at or above 30%, as in the case of South Africa and 
Ethiopia. 
What can account for this wide range of outcomes? This section presents a basic 
structure for understanding labor market segmentation and then proceeds to a more in depth 
analysis of three emblematic cases: structural unemployment in South Africa, search 
                                                                                                                                            
entrepreneurs and business owners in the formal sector who constitute a very small share of the total, 
and high-income professionals such as attorneys, independent financial service providers or doctors. 
Inclusion of both groups implies that earnings data for self-employment will over-estimate earnings in 
the informal sector. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the special attention given to wage 
employment in the following sections is targeted only at identifying sources of high-earnings 
opportunities, rather than at giving preference to wage employment over self-employment or informal 
activities per se.   5
unemployment in Ethiopia, and widespread informality in Ghana. One way of approaching 
this question is through an adaptation of the familiar Harris-Todaro dual economy model. 
Consider an urban economy which is divided between three classes of workers: formal sector 
workers, informal or self-employed workers, and the unemployed. Suppose that agents 
entering the labor market face the option of queuing/searching for a formal sector job or 
pursuing self-employment in the free-entry informal sector.
2 The number of workers falling 
into each category is depicted on the horizontal axis of Figure 2, with their respective wages 
on the vertical axes (formal sector employment and wages are read from the left, the informal 
sector from the right).  
  Agents base their choice of which sector to enter on two factors: the wages available 
to them and their perceived probability of finding a job in each sector. Individual 
characteristics may clearly influence both of these. In a perfectly competitive market wages 
would be the same in both sectors for an individual with given characteristics, with 
employment divided at the crossing point of the formal and informal sector labor demand 
curves (read from the left and right axes, respectively). In contrast, standard Harris-Todaro 
analysis of African labor markets posits an institutionally rigid formal sector wage, wf
 in the 
figure, far in excess of the market clearing level. This high formal wage has two direct effects: 
first it constrains formal sector labor demand; second, the prospect of securing lucrative 
formal sector work entices some share of workers who would otherwise enter the informal 
sector to remain unemployed and search for formal employment. The probability of finding 
such a job is assumed to decline with the number of people searching, creating an equilibrium 
level of job searchers depicted by the line pp’. The overall result is a segmented labor market 
with large earnings differentials and insufficient labor demand, stemming from institutional 
rigidities.  
Turning to the analysis of individual case studies, Figure 2 suggests at least three 
broad factors to be considered in studying the segregation of a given labor market. First of all, 
earnings differentials between formal and informal employment remain central. These may 
include public sector wages or the wage premium garnered by unionized workers. They may 
also include considerations related to efficiency wages and more general bargaining issues 
that drive a wedge between wages for identical workers. Second, differences in individual 
characteristics might influence a worker’s probability of finding formal sector worker, making 
the decision to risk open unemployment more or less attractive. For instance, more educated 
workers may see fit to forego the informal sector and queue for government jobs. Finally, the 
decision to queue for formal work is almost certainly affected by an individual’s ability to 
support herself in unemployment.  
                                                 
2 This builds on the assumption, consistent with some evidence but open to debate, that agents cannot 
or do not simultaneously hold informal sector employment and search for a formal sector job.  6
The dominant view of unemployment in developing countries is that open 
unemployment is due to search. This indeed was the view underlying the initial presentation 
of the Harris-Todaro (1970) model. If search for a formal sector job from the unemployed 
state is more efficient than from informal employment, those able to afford unemployment 
remain openly unemployed and search. However, the poor cannot afford it. Thus, if most 
unemployment in the economy is of the voluntary search variety, the relationship between 
unemployment and household income is likely to be positive because the well-off will choose 
search unemployment but the poor will enter informal sector employment. Whether this is the 
case for South Africa is considered next.  
Case 1: Unemployment and Self Employment in South Africa 
Unemployment in South Africa, using the broad definition, rose from 31% in 1993 to 
42% in 2003. On the ‘narrow’ definition, where the labor force is defined as the employed 
plus the searching unemployed, unemployment rose from 17% in 1995 to 32% in 2003. (See 
Tables A2 and notes to that Table). This high and rising level of unemployed reflects in part 
the failure of either the formal or informal sector to provide new jobs and in part an 
unprecedented growth in the size of the labor force. Labor force participation rates of women 
rose by a remarkable 15 percentage points in the eight years between 1995 and 2003. They 
rose by 5 percentage points for men in that period. The increase in participation rates for both 
men and women is likely due to the lifting of apartheid restriction on movement to urban 
areas and the new possibilities of employment that this was perceived to open. Education 
levels have risen and participation rates typically increase with education level, particularly 
so for women. Lastly, the significantly higher increase in female than male participation rate 
appears to be because of a decline in women’s access to male income due to increase 
unemployment among males, the HIV epidemic, and increased female headship due to 
change in household structure (Casale and Posel, 2001). 
Kingdon and Knight (2004) find little support for the idea that people choose to be 
unemployed, one interpretation of the unemployment outcome of the Harris-Todaro model set 
out in Figure 2. The unemployed are, on average, substantially worse off than the informally 
employed – both in terms of income and expenditure and in terms of a range of indicators of 
well-being. This contradicts the luxury or search unemployment interpretation, whereby 
higher income increases the incentive to remain searching and reduces the incentive to obtain 
informal employment.  
It might be argued that, given the disutility of work, some people prefer to 
substitute leisure for higher monetary income, so that their apparent deprivation cannot be 
used to argue that they are constrained to be unemployed. However, in order to interpret 
unemployment as voluntary, such people should be happier (or, at least, not unhappier) than  7
employed people. Data show that the unemployed are very substantially (and significantly) 
less happy than informally employed people, suggesting that their unemployment is not due to 
choice. Finally the average duration of uncompleted spells of unemployment (2.2 years) is too 
long to sustain a person in search unemployment. The fact that the unemployed are 
significantly poorer and unhappier than the informally employed suggests that jobless 
persons’ lack of entry into self employment is due to some impediments to entering the 
productive part of the informal work.  
Kingdon and Knight (2004) show that despite recent growth in informal 
employment, South Africa is an international outlier in terms of the small size of its informal 
sector: the ratio of non-agricultural informal sector employment to unemployment is 0.7 in 
South Africa but 4.7 in Sub Saharan Africa, 7.0 in Latin America and 11.9 in Asia. As defined 
by the South African statistical agency, the ‘informal sector’ absorbed only 15.7% of the 
workforce in 1997 and 18.8% in 2002.  
What prevents or discourages the unemployed from entering the informal sector? In 
a survey of 500 informal sector operators in the Johannesburg area in 1999, respondents listed 
crime, lack of access to credit, lack of access to infrastructure and services, and need for 
training as the top four constraints on their businesses. Chandra et al. (2002, pp. 26, 30) find 
that the informal sector operators had required substantial start-up capital (averaging over 2.5 
times the average monthly earnings in the sample). New small businesses have to rely on their 
own financial resources: there was very little access to either formal or even informal credit. 
However, these problems exist in most developing countries and do not explain the smallness 
of the South African informal sector.  
One thing that does distinguish South Africa is the observed effectiveness of 
enforcement of labor regulations. Labor market institutions such as Industrial Councils (now 
called Bargaining Councils) and Wage Boards set sectoral minimum wages and stipulate 
working conditions in many industries in South Africa. These minimum wages and 
stipulations are applied to all firms in the industry and region, irrespective of size, via the 
‘extension’ provision. There are serious penalties for flouting the agreements of these 
institutions. Such provisions impose a burden of high labor costs on small firms and it is 
likely that they would seriously inhibit the entry and growth of such firms. This is one 
explanation for the large average size of firms in South Africa. These institutional features 
may inhibit small firms but they should not inhibit individual entrepreneurship, i.e., owner-
operators.  
Case 2: Search Unemployment in Ethiopia 
  As of 1994, the unemployment rate among urban males in Ethiopia was 
approximately 50%, one of the highest rates observed anywhere in the world. With per capita  8
GDP at the time of only $520, Ethiopia provides a striking contrast to the folk wisdom that 
open unemployment is a rich country phenomenon and surplus labor is absorbed by the 
informal sector in poor countries. What do we know about the unemployed in Ethiopia and 
what affects their probability of finding work? 
  Examining the composition of the urban unemployed, Serneels (2004) finds that a 
majority are well educated and come from middle class households. They are predominantly 
young, with the highest unemployment rates at 19 years of age, have a median duration in 
unemployment of nearly 4 years, and a majority have never held paid work in their lifetimes. 
It is important to note also that approximately half of young unemployed males in urban 
Ethiopia report that they are searching for a job in the public sector, implying job queues for 
this sector far in excess of the employment opportunities. 
  Turning to the factors which determine whether a young male becomes employed or 
unemployed, Serneels finds that education raises the probability of unemployment up to the 
tertiary level, which has an indeterminate effect. Given that returns to education are 
significantly higher for males in the public versus private sector in Ethiopia (Krishnan, et al, 
1998) this pattern is consistent with the basic framework described above: personal 
characteristics which increase an individual’s potential earnings in the public or formal sector 
and/or increase their probability of securing such a job will likewise increase their probability 
of entering the unemployment pool vis-à-vis the informal sector. Similarly, young males 
whose father is a civil servant are more likely to be unemployed—perhaps due to a 
networking or informational advantage in public sector job search—while those whose father 
is self-employed are less so. However, while education and social capital appear to contribute 
to the likelihood of unemployment, one must be careful not to assume that it is purely a 
middle class phenomenon, the familiar “luxury unemployment.” Once unemployed, the 
probability of finding work is positively correlated with family wealth, with poorer job 
searchers exhibiting significantly longer unemployment duration. 
  Finally, although the precise causes and potential cures for high unemployment in 
Ethiopia require further research, the stylized facts reviewed here suggest that public-private 
and formal-informal wage differentials may play a central role. Wage data in Table A3 of the 
appendix show that while the public-private gap in the formal sector is small, the gap 
between formal employment and self-employment widened dramatically in the 1990s, 
reaching 85% by 1997. 
Case 3: High Informality and Low Unemployment  
While South Africa and Ethiopia represent two important cases within SSA, most of 
the labor markets in SSA economies for which we have comparable data display a very 
different pattern of labor market outcomes. Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania all have a large self- 9
employment sector which absorbs increases in the labor supply. The differences we observe 
are not due to differences in the rate of labor supply increase which has been rapid in all these 
countries. The inference would appear to be that the reason for the differential rates of growth 
of the informal sectors within these economies is a direct result of the rate of growth of formal 
sector employment. It is possible that for most African economies – we obviously exclude 
Ethiopia and South Africa – there is a competitive free-entry self-employment sector in which 
earnings are not significantly different from the lower part of the distribution among wage 
earners in firms. As we document below, wage dispersion within the firm sector is very large. 
In terms of our framework for African labor markets, this suggests that in these countries 
informal sector wages have fallen to clear the labor market. Rather than unemployment, the 
primary issue of policy concern is the low wages at which the informal market clears.  
4.  ‘Flexibility’ in African labor markets 
 
How can the diversity of outcomes across Africa documented in the previous section 
be explained? In particular which, if any, of the three dimensions of labor market inflexibility 
identified in the introduction can help in explain the patterns we observe in unemployment 
and the lack of formal sector employment growth. In this section we review the evidence for 
each of the three dimension of inflexibility. 
Wage adjustments over time 
  The most commonly noted aspect of labor market flexibility is the ability of 
aggregate real wages to decline over time. Based on country studies there are differences of 
view as to whether African labor markets can be considered flexible in this sense of the term.  
Reviewing the Kenyan experience through the two oil shocks, a severe drought in 
1984 and subsequent stabilization programs, Milne & Neizert (1994) conclude modern wages 
were quite flexible: “Through the adjustment phase, real wages in all modern sectors fell, 
although the drop in the public sector was more pronounced. Indeed, real wage rates seem to 
have provided the major part of the adjustment as there do not appear to have been major 
changes in the urban unemployment rate.” (p. 454) 
Writing on Ghana in the same volume, Beaudry and Sowa (1994) note that wages 
differentials between sectors were fairly quick to respond to demand shifts (toward agriculture 
and industry, away from services) brought about by structural adjustment and that “a flexible 
labor market probably helped achieve the macroeconomic improvements observed in Ghana 
during the 1980s.” (p. 402)  10
  Even in South Africa where, as will be discussed below, unions are an important part 
of the wage setting process, real wages for Africans have fallen over the period from 1995 to 
2003 according to the data presented in Casale et al (2004).  
Despite this evidence for flexibility, a detailed assessment of wage misalignment for 
CFA franc economies by Rama (2000) concluded that wages in these countries showed some 
evidence of real rigidity in that they closely tracked public sector wages and consumer price 
indices. In an international comparison, Rama found that wages in CFA countries from 1985-
93 remained considerably higher than could be explained by their level of development, 
urbanization, industrialization or human capital intensity. Similarly, evidence presented by 
Krishnan, et al (1998) shows that real wages in the urban Ethiopian labor market have been 
surprisingly unresponsive to downward pressure from economic reforms, even amidst high 
rates of open unemployment. 
For two countries more detail of real wage changes in the manufacturing sector can 
be given. Figure 3 presents data from the World Bank’s Africa Regional Program on 
Enterprise Development (RPED) and follow-up work at the Centre for the Study of African 
Economies (CSAE) which enables real wage changes to be measured over the 1990s in which 
there are controls for the human capital characteristics of the worker and the size of the firm 
in which they work. As discussed in later sections, firm level variables such as unionization, 
capital stock, formal sector registration, and firm size itself are highly correlated with wages 
even after allowing for differences based on human capital. Controlling for firm size is a 
means of providing a more comparable picture of wages over time for workers in firms of a 
given size. 
The first point to be drawn from Figure 3 is that real wages in these manufacturing 
sectors have experienced quite erratic fluctuations over the 1990s. For both countries the 
Figure shows the percentage change in real wage relative to the base year of 1992. Thus 
Ghanaian manufacturing wages experienced a 30% drop from 1990 to 1995 and then a 
substantial rise such that by the end of the decade they were only modestly below their level 
of 1992. Clearly, explaining this roller-coaster ride in real wages is a very important research 
question and at present we have little idea how these changes over time are to be explained. 
The contrast with Tanzania is striking in that over the decade real wages in the Tanzanian 
manufacturing sector grew quite rapidly. By 2000 they were some 40 per cent above their 
1992 level.  
Does this more detailed evidence from the manufacturing sector suggest flexibility of 
wages over time? It certainly suggests that any notion of a fixed real wage is not a useful way 
of modeling outcomes - very substantial changes in real wages within the sector have been 
observed. However it does not rule out the possibility that workers within a firm can in the 
long run resist pressures for declines in wages. The declines in Ghana occurred in the context  11
of a highly variable rate of inflation. It is possible - we need longer runs of data to know - that 
the changes in real wages reflect not the flexibility that comes from excess supply pushing 
down prices but from mistakes being made by workers in setting their nominal wages when 
they cannot accurately predict the rate of inflation. 
So far we have considered country based data. What of comparison across countries 
and between Africa and other regions. Figure 4 shows average U.S. dollar wages across 
selected regions at the beginning and end of the 1990s (Freeman and Oostendorp, 2000, 
OWW database). What appears striking is that while average wages in Africa have fallen 
during the 1990s they remain above the level for East Asia. The data presented in the Figure 
are based on population weighted means which ensures that the data for East Asia for the 
1990s is dominated by China. The contrasts between East Asia and SSA which have been a 
prominent aspect of relative international growth rates for a long period have, if anything 
increased in the 1990s. Certainly the macro data we have suggest that wages in SSA remain, 
on average, high relative to their East Asian competitors.  
Wage adjustments in response to unemployment 
Another aspect of flexibility stressed in recent empirical work on developed country 
labor markets is the responsiveness of wages to local unemployment rates, a relationship 
which Blanchflower and Oswald (1995) have termed the “wage curve.” Tests of this 
relationship in urban African labor markets by Hoddinott (1996) for Côte d’Ivoire and 
Kingdon and Knight (1999) for South Africa have yielded results strikingly similar to those 
for the United States and Canada: a wage-unemployment elasticity of approximately -0.1. The 
finding of a wage curve of this form, particularly for South Africa, is both a surprising and 
important result.  
It is surprising because it has often been assumed that the South African labor market 
is particularly inflexible. Trade unions play an important role in wage determination in South 
Africa as will be discussed below. It is important for two reasons. First, it suggests strong 
similarities in labor markets across economies with very different levels of per capita income. 
The second implication of the finding is that the size of the wage fall is very large. Broadly 
the evidence suggests that a rise in unemployment of 10 per cent lowers wages by 1 per cent 
and that this elasticity appears to be constant over the range of unemployment from 0 to 30 
per cent. These figures imply that a rise in regional unemployment in South Africa from 10 to 
30 per cent reduce wages by 20 per cent. While the wage curve elasticity is low, the high 
levels of unemployment imply relatively large effects on wages. 
Wage differences between formal and informal sectors 
  How important is the distinction between the formal and informal sector or between 
large and small firms for understanding the pattern of wage differentials in African labor  12
markets? The term the informal sector refers to a large range of activities from urban self-
employment through household enterprises to wage employment in small firms. We first 
consider distinctions between the formal and informal sectors within wage employment 
before turning to the gap between self-employment and wage employment. 
  It could be objected that any differences between formal and informal sector wages 
simply reflect skill differences between workers in each sector. Thus comparisons across 
sectors need to use earnings regressions to examine differences between sectors while 
controlling for differences in personal characteristics including observable human capital. 
Lachaud (1995) uses this technique to compute formal sector earnings premia of 57.1% for 
Burkina Faso, 60.3% for Cameroon, 40.9% for Côte d’Ivoire, and 9.6% for Mali. Miller and 
Vallée (1995) and Vallée and Thomas (1994) confirm these orders of magnitude for 
Cameroon, as do Vijverberg and van der Gaag (1993) for Côte d’Ivoire. In South Africa, 
Kingdon and Knight (2004) find that 50-64% of the large formal-informal earnings difference 
remains after controlling for characteristics, depending on whether OLS or selectivity-
corrected earnings functions are used. 
  A closely related approach is to compare the wages of similar workers in 
establishments of varying size. Firm size can provide a clearer basis for comparison than the 
formal-informal distinction which is often inconsistently defined across studies. Examination 
of employer-size wage differentials also allows for direct comparison with developed country 
labor markets, where the positive relationship between size and wages has been the subject of 
an enormous amount of research.  
To show how these size premiums translate into effects on wages across firms Figure 
5 shows the wage differential between a firm with 20 versus 100 employees for a production 
worker in the manufacturing sector with a given set of human capital characteristics It seems 
safe to conclude from Figure 5 that wage differences between the large and small firm sectors 
are uniformly large across African countries, they significantly exceed those observed in 
developed economies and they cannot be explained by the observed skills of the workforce. 
Recent work in this area has investigated if this size effect is due to the unobserved 
skills of the workforce. The collection of panel worker data, to match the panel data of the 
firm, has made this possible. Söderbom, Teal and Wambugu (2002, forthcoming) show that 
this size affect is only in small part due to unobserved skills. Changes in the size of the firm, 
controlling for all time-invariant aspects of both the firm and the worker lead to increases in 
earnings. While this firm size effect on wages is not attributable to skills (observable or 
unobservable), it is consistent with a wide range of possible explanations including aspects of 
efficiency wages and bargaining. The section below examines a number of these potential 
explanations in greater detail.   13
Measuring self-employment incomes  
Looking at the raw earnings data it appears that wage earners, and public sector 
employees in particular, have a distinct advantage over the self-employed. Table A3 in the 
appendix shows that in 1998/9, for instance, the differential for wage-employment over self-
employment in urban Ghana was 17%, while the public sector wage differential was over 
50%. For Ethiopia by 1997 these gaps had spread to nearly 100 and 150% respectively. In 
South Africa in 1993 among Africans, the differential for wage employment over self-
employment was 76%, while the public sector over self-employment wage differential was 
170%.  
However for much the same set of reasons that we think larger firms may employ 
different quality labor from that found in small firms we might expect the self-employed to 
differ in many respects from those in wage employment. There is in making these 
comparisons a further problem in that measuring self-employment incomes is far more 
difficult than measuring wage incomes.  
In this sub-section we will use the Ghana data to investigate how the incomes of the 
self-employed can be measured and compared to incomes from wage employment. In the 
GLSS surveys which have been conducted over a long period from 1987/88 to 1998/99, 
questions were asked which sought to elicit the incomes of the self employed. There are in 
fact at least two quite different methods for seeking to measure self-employment incomes. 
One is to directly seek information on net income, the second is to impute income from a 
production function.  
Direct Measures 
In GLSS4, the section on employment asked individuals in the households what they received 
in payment for their activities - whether the payment be from wage or self-employment. 
Clearly there is for the self-employed some ambiguity as to how these questions were 
interpreted. Did the answer refer to their gross revenues or net and, if net, which costs were 
deducted from revenues? If the answers do refer to net incomes (ie. revenues less costs) then 
the income measure combines income from labor, human and physical capital. If we are 
interested in comparing the returns to labor across the wage and self-employment sectors we 
need some method of imputing the returns to capital (both human and physical).  
What do the GLSS data imply for differences between wage and urban self-
employment incomes using this direct method of measurement? Figure 6 shows the age-
earning profiles for the self-employed and wage employees from all four waves of the GLSS 
data. Incomes are measured in US$ so Figure 6 shows that incomes for those aged 20 incomes 
are virtually identical at US$245 per year (= exp(5.5)). The figure also shows that the 
earnings profile is steeper for the wage earner than the self-employed so that by age 45, the  14
wage earner has an income nearly 30 per cent higher than the self employed. [The figure 
shows that the wage earner income is US$518 (=exp(6.25)) and that of the self employed is 
US$403 (exp(6.0))]. While this is a substantial difference, possibly the most striking aspect of 
the result is how close are measured incomes for the self-employed and wage employees over 
the age range from 20 to 30. 
It might well be thought that the measures of income for the self-employed would be 
so poor as to offer little insight into their income opportunities. It is here that the advantage of 
having four independent surveys is relevant, for it is possible to see if a similar pattern 
emerges from all four cross-sections. Appendix Table A4 shows the regressions for the four 
cross- sections available. What seems striking is how similar are the age earnings profiles 
across these four independent surveys. This method of measuring incomes does pick up some 
systematic variation of the incomes of the self-employed with age.  
Indirect Measures 
The second method for imputing income to the self-employed is through the calculation of the 
incomes from household enterprises. There is a section in the GLSS survey which allows for 
this. As far as we are aware, no comparison has been done between these two sources of 
information. What we do in this sub-section, is to compare the incomes that result from the 
direct methods from household surveys (in the previous sub-section) with the use of the firm 
level data which the CSAE has collected since 1992.  
This indirect method infers the incomes that accrue to labor from a production 
function. In the simplest case, a production function shows the relationship between two 
inputs, capital and labor, and the value-added these inputs produce. In work at the CSAE, we 
have shown that a satisfactory way to represent this requires slightly more generality in that 
raw materials and indirect costs are other important inputs that need to be modelled, see 
Söderbom and Teal (2004). In the simplest form of this production function, the marginal 
product of labor - the extra amount of output each person working in the firm produces - is 
proportional to the average product which is simply output divided by labor input. Thus in 
assessing the income available to the self-employed, we ask what is the marginal product of 
labor in very small firms. In doing so, we assume that the self-employed whose incomes are 
measured in the household surveys are similar to those working in micro enterprises in the 
firm surveys.  
To infer incomes for the self-employed by this indirect method, we need to know 
both the average product of labor in small firms and the relative importance of labor in 
producing output. How much does labor productivity differ by firm size? For micro 
enterprises (those employing less than five people) the median labor productivity is 
US$2,433. This compares with a median labor productivity of US$8,600 for firms with more  15
than 100 employees. To convert this number for average productivity to the marginal product 
for labor, we need to know the relative importance of labor in producing output. Söderbom 
and Teal (2004, p. 380) gives a factor of 0.17 which implies a labor income to working in 
small enterprises of US$414 (0.17 x 2,433).  
Thus this indirect method gives labor income to the self-employed of US$414. The 
direct method used above gave a figure of US$403 for a self-employed person aged 45. It 
would seem there is a remarkable similarity between the two methods in producing an 
estimate of labor income for the self-employed. Further the gap, at least for younger workers, 
between self-employment and wage earnings is small. We have evidence here that for the 
type of economy we have termed ‘High informality and low unemployment’ wages are 
sufficiently low to clear the labor market.   
 
5  Why do large formal sector firms pay wages far in 
excess of workers’ apparent alternatives?  
 
In their analysis of wage gaps in Cameroon, Thomas and Vallée (1996) list six 
possible causes of labor market segmentation in Africa, i.e., high formal sector wages which 
are not explained by workers’ skills and productivity.  
•  High formal sector wages may be due to the presence of trade unions in the formal 
sector. 
•  Minimum wages and other labor regulations, which are by definition only applicable 
in the formal sector, may dictate wage levels. 
•  Monopoly rents accrue to formal sector firms which are insulated from competition 
by the regulatory structure, and these rents may be shared with employees through a 
bargaining process. 
•  It may be worthwhile for only the most able managers to bear the expense of formal 
sector registration, contributing to higher productivity and, in turn, wages in this 
sector. 
•  Because larger size is often associated with higher turnover and monitoring costs, 
formal firms may pay efficiency wages to retain employees and increase productivity 
while informal firms do not. 
•  Finally, firms may discriminate on criteria not related to productivity, such as gender 
or ethnicity.  
The source of wage differentials and labor market segmentation is a matter of 
contentious debate, precisely because the policy implications are so stark. If, on the one hand, 
high formal sector wages simply reflect the greater human capital and productivity of workers  16
who secure these jobs then the lack of formal sector labor demand in many African 
economies can be directly attributed to a shortage of skilled labor. On the other hand, if high 
wages in the formal sector are attributable to unions and government regulations, stimulating 
labor demand will require not an increase in skills but rather reforms in labor market 
institutions. Thus the task of this section will be to assess the evidence on the role of labor 
market institutions in explaining wage setting behavior in the formal sector.  
  The following paragraphs review the evidence on two categories of labor market 
institutions: unions and other bargaining mechanisms. The discussion draws heavily on 
several studies which have employed firm and worker data from Africa’s manufacturing 
sector collected through the World Bank’s Regional Program for Enterprise Development 
(RPED), as well as numerous household surveys.  
Trade Unions 
It is useful to distinguish the possible effect of unions on two separate dimensions of 
labor flexibility outlined earlier: wage adjustments over time and labor segmentation between 
sectors. In his analysis of wage misalignment in CFA countries, Rama (2000) addressed the 
first of these questions, asking whether unions can explain the incomplete adjustment of 
wages in these countries during the 1990s. He concludes that “private sector unions… seemed 
more instrumental in achieving wage moderation than wage drift. Their members usually had 
lower wages than similar, non-unionised workers, which probably reflects the ‘subordinate’ 
nature of the labor movement.” This latter observation is based on a review of research 
findings measuring union wage premiums in which a number of studies report a negative 
union wage premium for CFA countries (see Table A5, the relevant part reproduced from 
Rama, 2000, in the Appendix).  
A second question is whether unions can explain labor market segmentation between 
firms or sectors. While focusing on a different subset of countries, research on this topic has 
produced dramatically different findings on the size of the union wage premium in Africa. For 
the case of South Africa, Schultz and Mwabu (1998) find an average union wage premium for 
African workers of 47%.
3 In addition, they use a quantile regression approach to examine the 
effect of unionization on wages for workers in each segment of the income distribution. For 
African workers at the 10
th percentile, unionization is estimated to increase wages by 145%, 
while at the 90
th percentile the effect is only 11%. For white workers the numbers are 
significantly lower, at 21% and negative 24% respectively.  
Work undertaken by CSAE updating the Schultz and Mwabu (1998) work suggest 
that this union premium has risen markedly in the period from 1995 to 1999. Even controlling 
                                                 
3 Butcher and Rouse (2003) argue that a much lower figure for the union wage premium among 
Africans workers – around 20%, obtained by controlling for industry – is the relevant statistic. This 
places the South African union premium in 1993 at more comparable levels to the U.S. and U.K.  17
for industry the union premium in 1999 was 53.8 per cent, massively higher than that 
observed in OECD countries (see Table A5). Controlling for firm size, Blunch and Verner 
(2004) perform a similar analysis for the Ghanaian manufacturing sector and are unable to 
find a significant wage effect from unionization when looking at workers as a whole, but find 
a 34% premium at the 10
th percentile.  
Work to date emphasizes the remarkable divergence that has been observed for the 
union premium. More evidence is becoming available as a result of the firm surveys carried 
out in Africa’s manufacturing sector. These surveys collected both labor market and firm 
information. It is thus possible to control for the human capital of the workers and for firm 
characteristics for similar types of firms over several countries. It may well be thought that the 
South African economy is an outlier within Africa as far as the importance of the union 
premium is concerned. Figure 7 draws from these labor and firm surveys for Ghana, Kenya, 
Nigeria and Tanzania to provide a comparison with the union premium for South Africa.  
Figure 7 shows the union premium for the five countries for which we currently have 
comparable data. The first column shows the union wage premium for a production worker in 
the manufacturing sector with no controls, while in the second column there are controls for 
gender and differences in skills measured by age, years of education, and job tenure (though 
none of the underlying regressions includes controls for other aspects of the firm, either 
sectors within manufacturing or size). While controlling for skills dramatically reduces the 
union effect, the remaining union premia are still very large by international standards. 
Indeed, premia of 49 and 32% for Ghana and Nigeria respectively are as high or higher than 
the average union effects found for South Africa, suggesting this latter country may not be so 
idiosyncratic as sometimes assumed. Furthermore, the importance of differences across 
quantiles noted in the work discussed above suggests that these averages hide important 
differences that require investigation. As they stand, they suggest an important role for unions 
as part of the institutional structure that drives wages across workers with similar levels of 
human capital.  
In conclusion, while there is an emerging body of evidence to suggest that unions 
play a central role in many African labor markets, systematic identification of their effects is 
complicated by the factor that unionization is highly correlated with other leading 
explanations for labor market distortions including the other regulations reviewed in this 
section, monopoly power of producers, and firm size more generally. The success of the 
quantile regression approach in identifying union premiums for low wage workers may relate 
precisely to their ability to compare these workers — concentrated in smaller firms — with a 
baseline of low-wage non-union workers for whom union contracts do not apply. Separating 
out such a control group within large formal sector firms is extremely difficult. Further 
research in this area should focus on disentangling such potentially correlated factors as union  18
status, regulatory coverage, firm size, worker skills, and capital intensity. 
 
Rent-seeking, institutions and efficiency wages 
  So far we have focused on a model of the labor market where the large observed 
deviations from competitive wage levels (i.e., from wages based solely on individual human 
capital characteristics) are due to overt institutional or regulatory interventions. However, 
large formal sector firms may also pay high wages to increase labor efficiency, or as a result 
of rent-seeking behavior by workers which may or may not occur in a union context.  
In the case of efficiency wage models, a link between wages and effort or 
productivity may arise for a variety of reasons, including the increased fear of dismissal when 
wages are high (Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1974), a tendency for better paid workers to be better 
nourished and in better health (Dasgupta & Ray, 1986), increased morale from above average 
earnings, and so on. Similarly, above market-clearing wages may reduce labor turnover, 
creating a necessary link between high wages and large formal firms (Stiglitz,  1974; 
Manning, 2003). 
  One major piece of empirical evidence already described which is consistent with the 
idea of efficiency wage setting in Africa is the wage curve literature discussed in Section 3. 
The causal link from unemployment to lower wages found in this literature is inconsistent 
with purely competitive wages based on human capital alone, but can be readily explained in 
an efficiency wage model such as that of Shapiro Stilglitz. Along these lines, Fafchamps and 
Söderbom (2004) use worker-firm matched data across 10 African countries from the RPED 
surveys to establish a connection between firm size and wages, and show that this prominent 
feature of the data is consistent with wage setting behavior determined by labor management 
concerns. In support of this hypothesis, they show that worker effort and productivity increase 
with both the level of supervision and wages, two incentive mechanisms stressed in many 
efficiency wage models. 
  One implication of these findings is that labor management may be a more acute 
problem for African firms than their competitors elsewhere. Fafchamps and Söderbom find 
that the wage-elasticity of effort is around 0.45, compared with 0.74 in Morocco, which the 
authors posit as a control case. A second key implication of the whole class of efficiency 
wage models is that the high wages observed in larger, more productive formal sector firms 
need not depend on labor market institutions, but rather are a necessary result of the firms’ 
organizational structure. As far as policy is concerned, the link from labor market “flexibility” 
to job creation is effectively broken. 
  Rent-seeking models attribute wage differentials to a process of bargaining – implicit  19
or explicit – that takes place between workers and the owners of capital over the rents or 
profits from production. Evidence of such “rent-sharing” effects on wages has been found for 
a wide range of countries, including Ghana (Teal, 1996) and Zimbabwe (Velenchik, 1997) 
within Africa. Furthermore, as Blanchflower, et al (1994) note, these effects appear to be 
fairly consistent across countries with widely differing institutional structures and 
unionization rates, indicating a role for bargaining even in the absence of unions. 
  In conclusion, the evidence presented at the beginning of this section makes clear that 
a subset of African workers earn large wage premia which are inconsistent with competitive 
wage setting and cannot be explained by their skills alone. However, there are competing 
models to explain these wage differentials, and the relative importance of these different 
effects may produce very different policy conclusions.  
 
6.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
This paper has sought to provide an overview of how African labor markets have 
performed in the 1990s and to ask how far these outcomes can be explained by the 
inflexibility of the labor market. In this section we summarise what we have found and draw 
conclusions for policy.  
We began by drawing on a wide range of data sources to provide an overview of 
recent outcomes in African labor markets. We found that in all five countries formal wage 
employment has increased and that this very gradual trend in job creation has been driven 
primarily by the private sector, with the proportion of wage employees in the public sector 
declining in each country. However, expansion in the formal sector has not kept pace with 
growth in the size of the labor force, meaning that the relative proportion of workers in 
formal wage employment has either remained constant or declined in each country. Second, 
this common result of excess labor supply takes widely divergent forms across the continent 
delineated as either structural unemployment as in South Africa, search unemployment as in 
Ethiopia or the growth of the informal sector as in Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda.  
South Africa, the largest economy in the region, suffers one of the highest 
unemployment rates in the world. Evidence suggests that individuals who are out of work are 
not unemployed voluntarily, in any meaningful sense of the word, thus the search for an 
explanation turns primarily to structural constraints preventing job creation. While at nearly 
the opposite income extreme within the region, urban Ethiopia records similarly high 
unemployment rates to South Africa. However, examining the profile of unemployed persons 
shows them to be disproportionately young, well-educated, and from affluent backgrounds (in 
contrast to South Africa). Evidence suggests high public sector wages may contribute to job  20
queuing by the relatively educated. Finally, a majority of African economies lie somewhere in 
the income range between Ethiopia and South Africa, but report low or negligible levels of 
open unemployment. Instead, a large informal or self-employed sector dominates the 
economy. We have focused on diagnosing the causes of this labor market segmentation and 
the failure of large formal firms to absorb the pool of low-wage labor. 
  Labor market policy debates frequently invoke the concept of “flexibility.” In this 
paper we have identified at least three distinct attributes of labor markets all related to the 
flexibility of wages and employment. The ability of real wages to decline over time; the 
tendency for wages to adjust in the face of unemployment; and the extent of wage 
differentials between sectors and/or firms of various size.  
  We have reviewed evidence showing that African labor markets may be surprisingly 
flexible in the first two senses—rising and falling erratically at points in the last decade, and 
exhibiting a “wage curve” relationship with respect to unemployment. However, there seems 
compelling evidence that “rigidity,” in the sense that we observe substantial wage 
differentials between firms and sectors, certainly characterizes African labor markets. This 
third sense of the term inflexibility can explain the common factor across African economies - 
the high income divide between those working in large firms and those not. Those working in 
the thriving self-employment sector in Ghana have something in common with the 
unemployed in South Africa - both have very low income opportunities relative to those in 
large firms.  
In the case of Ghana this process of “informalization” implies a shift within wage 
employment to lower paid jobs so average wage earnings may be falling even if wage rates 
for given types of jobs are not. In the case of South Africa the increase in unemployment 
lowers average incomes as the proportion of the labor force with wage jobs declines.  21 of 21 
Table A1. Employment by Sector for Selected Countries 
 
  1987/88  1988/89  1991/92  1998/99 
Ghana  % 000s % 000s % 000s  %  000s
Wage Employees  17.3 1,121 18.1 1,215 15.4 1,143  13.2  1,166
Government 8 518 7.9 530 7.8 579  5.9  521
State Enterprise  1.9 123 2.3 154 1.2 89  0.6  53
Private 7.4 480 7.9 530 6.4 475  6.7  592
Self-employment 19.5 1,264 24.2 1,624 23.5 1,744  27.3  2,411
Unpaid Family   2.2 143 1.1 74 1.3 96 0.3  26
Agriculture   58.7 3,804 54.6 3,664 56.7 4,207 55.7  4,918
Unemployed   2.2 143 1.9 127 3.2 237 3.5  309
Total Labor Force  100 6,480 100 6,710 100 7,420  100  8,830
  1992  1999/00 
  Total  M  F  Total  M  F 
Uganda  %  000s  % 000s % 000s % 000s % 000s  %  000s
Wage Employment  15.3  968  24.2 772 6.3 196 13.3 1,050 21.3 807  5.9  243
Public 5.4  343  8 254 2.9 90 3.4 265 5.3 201  1.6  65
Private 9.9  625  16.2 518 3.4 106 9.9 785 16 607  4.3  178
Self Employment  7.6  482  9.5 302 5.7 180 10.3 815 11.8 447  8.9  367
Agriculture 76.2  4,819  65.3 2,083 87.4 2,736 75.5 5,959 65.5 2,477 84.7  3,481
Unemployed 0.9  55  1.1 34 0.7 21 0.9 68 1.3 50  0.4  18
Total Labor Force  100 6,324  100 3,191 100 3,133 100 7,892 100 3,782  100  4,110
    1991/92    2000/01 
Tanzania  % 000s %  000s
Wage Employment  7.93 899 7.40  1,071
Government 3.79 430 2.17  314
State Enterprise  1.95 221 0.72  104
Private 2.19 248 4.51  653
Self Employed  5.23 593 8.44  1,221
Unpaid Family  5.65 640 9.38  1,358
Agriculture 80.41 9,114 69.04  9,992
Unemployed 0.79 89 1.20  173
Total Labor Force  100.00 11,335 100.00  14,473
Total population    24,522  31,878
  1993 (Saldru)
   1995 (OHS)  2003 (LFS) 
South Africa (%)
1  Total  Male Female Total Male Female Total  Male  Female
Wage employment  60.9 66.4 54.5 60.2 70.8 47.0 47.7 52.9  42.3
 - Public  15.0 15.7 14.2 9.4 9.5  9.2
 - Private  45.9 50.7 40.3 38.3 43.4  33.1
Self employment  7.9 6.6 9.3 10.4 6.7 15.0 10.6 11.3 9.8
 - Agriculture  0.4 0.5 0.3 1.3 1.5  1.2
 - Other  7.5 6.2 9.0 9.2 9.8  8.6
Employment  68.8 73.1 63.8 70.6 77.5 62.0 58.2 64.3  52.2
Unemployment  31.2 26.9 36.2 29.4 22.5 38.0 41.8 35.7  47.8
Labor Force  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0
Participation Rate    56.4 65.9 47.8 66.7  71.1  62.822 of 22 
 
  1993 (Saldru)  1995 (OHS)  2003 (LFS) 
South Africa (‘000s)  TotalMale Female Total MaleFemaleTotal  Male  Female
Wage employment  7849 4657 3202 8231 5379 2852 9509 5302 4207
 - Public  1933 1101 834 1869 949 920
 - Private  5916 3556 2368 7640 4353 3287
Self employment  1018 463 546 1421 513 908 2111 1134 977
 - Agriculture  52 35 18 269 148 121
 - Other  967 435 529 1842 986 856
Employment  8868 5127 3748 9652 5892 376011622 6436 5187
Unemployment  4021 1887 2127 4015 1710 2305 8332 3579 4753
Labor Force  12889 7014 587513667 7602 606519954 10015 9939
1994  1997 
%  % 
Ethiopia 
(Urban Areas) 
Total  M  F  Total  M  F 
Wage Employees  42.9  47.4  37  47.8  54.3  40.2 
Public  25  26.4  23.2  26.7  29.3  23.7 
Private  17.9  21  13.8  21.1  25  16.5 
Self Empl.  17.6  18.8  16  22.3  18  27.4 
Unemployed  39  33.8  47.8  29.9  27.7  32.4 
                 
Labor Force  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Participation Rate  55.8  68.3  42  57.2  62.7  51.9 
1986  1998/99  Kenya  
(Urban Areas)  %  Millions  %  Millions 
Wage Employees  66.2       
Self Empl.  16.5       
Unemployed  16.9       
Participation  70.4       
Population         
Modern      38.0  1.56 
Informal      29.3  1.20 
Agriculture      3.7  0.15 
Not-stated      3.7  0.15 
Unemployed      25.1  1.03 
Participation      86.4  4.10 







1975-84  Burkina Faso 
(Oufadougou & 
Bobo Dioulasso)  M  F  M  F  M  F 
Formal Sector  23.2 7.5  15.4  3.9  8.3  3.7 
Private  13.4 1.8  7.9  0.5  3.3  0.8 
Public  9.8 5.7  7.5  3.4  5  2.9 
Informal Sector  76.8 92.5  84.6  96.1  91.7  96.3 
Agriculture  11.9 5.5  9.9  5.4  7.1  2 
Craft  8.5 13.4  16.5  8  15.2  4 
Petty trade – 
food 
8 61.6  5.3  54.8  11  52.6 
Petty trade – 
other  
8.5 8  26.7  13.6  26.1  14.3 
Services  39.9 4  26.2  14.3  32.3  23.4 
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Sources: Ghana: Teal (2000), based on Ghana Statistical Office surveys; Uganda: HIS 1992 and 
UNHS 1999/00, courtesy Simon Appleton; Tanzania: Household Budget Survey, courtesy Trudy 
Owens; South Africa: SALDRU (1994) “South Africans Rich and Poor”, South African Labor and 
Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town, August; StatsSA (1996) “October Household 
Survey 1995”, Statistical Release P0317.10. Statistics South Africa, Pretoria; and StatsSA (2004) 
“Labor Force Survey, September 2003”, Statistical Release P0210, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria; 
Ethiopia: Krishnan, et al (1998), based on 1
st and 3
rd rounds of the Ethiopian Urban Household Survey; 
Kenya: Urban Labor Force Survey, 1986; Labor Force Survey, 1998/99; Burkina Faso: Calvés & 
Schoumaker, World Development (2004), Table 1. 
1 See note below explaining the issues involved in comparing data sources across time in South Africa. 
2 Years represent birth cohorts. All numbers represent percentages from a 2000 survey who recalled 
finding their first paid employment in a given sector.  
 
Table A2 


















Strict labor force (employed + searching unemployed) 
Total labor 
force  
11 603 100  11 793 200  14 068 700  15 970 500  15 531 400  16 034 000  16 933 700 
Total 
unemployed  
1 971 900  2 688 700  3 671 200  4 231 900  4 687 600  4 986 900  5 354 200 
Unemployment 
rate  
17.0 22.8 26.1 26.5 30.2 31.1 31.6 
Broad labor force (employed + searching and non-searching unemployed) 
Total labor 
force  
13 648 000  14 468 000  17 169 800  18 250 200  18 556 000  19 276 700  20 259 600 
Total 
unemployed  
4 017 800  5 363 500  6 772 300  6 511 600  7 712 200  8 229 600  8 680 100 
Unemployment 
rate 
29.4 37.1 39.4 35.7 41.6 42.7 42.8 
 
Notes: Estimates are for all labor force participants aged between 15 and 65 years. The searching 
unemployed were identified as those who were willing to accept work and had actively searched for 
work in the four weeks prior to being interviewed.  
 
Source: Table 2 from Casale et. al. (2004). 
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Table A3. Wages for Selected Countries – Annual US$ and PPP$ 
 
Ghana  1987/88  1988/89  1991/92  1998/99 
   US$  PPP$  US$  PPP$  US$  PPP$  US$  PPP$ 
Public Wage Job 
1103.17 1545.55 1056.60 1664.10 1232.84 1940.25 1277.80 3250.69 
Private Wage 
Job  1106.78 1156.48  980.33 1161.00 1118.43 1423.07 1260.94 2093.57 
Self 
Employment  1129.27 1156.48 1001.20 1208.38 1227.62 1212.66 1224.81 1766.27 
Farmer  736.25 288.05 669.21 232.07 727.02 403.66 712.16 491.09 
         % gap between 
private and self 
employment    0.0   -3.9   17.4   18.5 
Source: Teal (2000), Ghana Statistical Office surveys. 
*Income from principal job 
 
Ethiopia  1994  1997 
  US$  PPP$  US$  PPP$ 
Public  Wage  Job  1,281 3,696 1,664 4,248 
Private  Wage  Job  1,206 3,479 1,426 3,496 
Self-employment* 1,496  4,315  655  1,890 
      
% gap between private and 
self employment   -19.4    85.0 
Source: Urban Labor Force Survey, 1986; Labor Force Survey, 1998/99 








  US$  PPP$   
African Wage workers  2,958  5,800  76.3 
African Public wage workers  4,530  8,883  170.1 
African Private wage workers  2,488  4,878  48.3 
African Self-employed workers  1,677  3,289  -- 
Source: Calculations from SALDRU survey, 1993. Note that these are arithmetic averages. 
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Table A4   Log Annual Income in US$ for the Urban Self-Employed in Ghana 
 
  1987/88 1988/89 1991/92 1998/99 
      
Education  in  years -0.045 -0.004 -0.035 -0.010 
 (1.76)  (0.18)  (1.98)*  (0.63) 
(Education in years)2    0.005 0.004 0.006 0.005 
 (2.48)*  (1.92)  (4.25)**  (3.78)** 
Age  in  years  0.061 0.091 0.068 0.075 
  (4.18)** (7.56)** (6.64)** (8.55)** 
(Age in years)2  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (4.65)** (7.90)** (6.48)** (8.47)** 
Constant  4.971 4.122 4.659 4.322 
  (15.96)** (15.62)** (21.22)** (22.68)** 
      
Observations  1181 1511 1865 2871 
R-squared 0.03  0.06  0.05  0.07 
      
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
   
Source: GLSS Surveys and author calculations. Each column shows the results of the earnings 
function for the survey year shown at the top of the column. 26 of 26 
 
Table A5. Wage Premia for Union Jobs 
Study   
  Estimation Technique  Country  Earnings Differential 
Miller & Vallée 
(1995) 
  OLS with dummy 
variable for union 
members 
Cameroon -8.1% 




OLS for formal sector 
jobs plus Logit for self-
selection 
Cameroon -10.7% 
Terrel & Svejnar 
(1989) 
  OLS with dummy 
variable for union 
members 
Senegal -12.5% 





with dummy for union 








Blunch & Verner 
(2004) 
  Quantile regression 
with dummy for union 










Union wage premium in South Africa 
  African  White 
  1993  1999  1993  1999 
Without controlling industry        
Coefficient on union dummy  0.468  0.561  -0.051  0.030 
t-value (14.7)  (24.7)  (0.8)  (0.6) 
Union premium  59.7%  75.2%  -5.0%  3.0% 
        
Controlling industry        
Coefficient on union dummy  0.191  0.430  -0.097  -0.022 
t-value (5.9)  (17.9)  (1.4)  (0.4) 
Union premium  21.0%  53.8%  -9.2%  -2.2% 
Note: Dependent variable is log of hourly wage and independent variables were education in years, its 
square, urban dummy and union status dummy. 
Source: Schultz and Mwabu (2001) for 1993 figures and own calculations from October Household 




 27 of 27 
     
    
    
             
             
Appendix A6  Ln (Real Earnings in Domestic Prices) 
Production Workers in the Manufacturing Sector 
    Ghana Kenya Nigeria  Tanzania 
          
[1]  Union  dummy  0.401 0.120 0.367 0.214 
 (no  controls)  (6.91)**  (1.91)  (3.18)**  (3.85)** 
          
[2]  Union  dummy  0.258 0.030 0.238 0.177 
  (controls for skills))  (4.90)**  (0.52)  (2.38)*  (3.49)** 
          
[3] Union  dummy  0.063  -0.072  0.065  0.070 
  (controls for skills and size)  (1.05) (1.23) (0.60) (1.35) 
          
[4]  Ln  (employment)  0.127 0.071 0.126 0.093 
   (5.19)**  (3.40)**  (2.24)*  (4.12)** 
        
  Observations  3973 1312  295  2403 
          
  Robust t statistics in parentheses       
  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       
Note: All equations have time dummies. 
 
Row [1] is the raw union premium with no controls. 
Row [2] is the union premium with controls for gender, age, age squared, education in years (linear 
and squared) and tenure.   
Row [3] is the union premium with controls for skills as in Row [3] and the log of firm 
employment. 
Row [4] is the coefficient on the log of employment in the regression reported in Row [3]. 
 
   Ghana  Kenya  Nigeria  Tanzania South  Africa 
          
[1]  Union  dummy  0.397 0.125 0.284 0.221  0.284 
 (no  controls)  (6.80)**  (2.02)* (2.65)**  (4.04)**  (9.33)** 
          
[2]  Union  dummy  0.258 0.039 0.155 0.181  0.200 
(controls for skills)  (4.92)**  (0.68) (1.73)  (3.63)**  (7.06)** 
          
 Observations  4012  1333  500  2668  2246 
         
Note: All equations have time dummies. 
 
Row [1] is the raw union premium with no controls.   
Row [2] is the union premium with controls for gender, age, age squared, and education in years 
(linear and squared). 
 
Notes: There are nine years of Ghana data covering the period 1992 to 2000; five years of Kenyan 
data covering the years 1993, 1994 , 1995, 1999 and 2000; six years of Tanzanian data covering 
the years 1992, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2000; two years of Nigerian data covering the years 
2000 and 2001. For all these countries the data is based on firm surveys of workers in the 
manufacturing sector, within the workers surveyed the regression confines the data to production 
workers. There are four years of South African household data taken from the OHS for 1993, 
1995, 1997 and 1999. For these individuals the sample is again confined to production workers in 
manufacturing.    28 of 28 
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Figure 3 Real Wage Changes over Time 
 
 
Figure 1. Trends in Non-Agricultural Employment by Sector  
(Absolute No. of Workers in Thousands) 
 
Sources: Table A1 in the Appendix, based on national household and labor surveys. The right hand axis 
refers to Ethiopia and South Africa and the left hand axis to the other countries.  
Figure 2. Wages and Employment in a Segmented Labor Market 
 
Note that the labor demand curves shown here are drawn for workers with a given level of
education and productivity, working in firms with a given level of capital stock—three
factors which may outweigh the wage rigidity concerns highlighted here in the
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Figure 4 Monthly US$ Wages for Unskilled Occupations 




























Figure 5  Wage Gap by Firm Size
% Difference in wages between a firm with 20 vs. 100 employees,
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Source: GLSS Surveys.
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Figure 7  Union Premia for Production Workers in 
Manufacturing
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